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ABSTRACT. This article presents a defense of Kant’s idea of a league of states.
Kant’s proposal that rightful or just international relations can be achieved within
the framework of such a league is often criticized for being at odds with his overall
theory. In view of the analogy he draws between an interpersonal and an inter-
national state of nature, it is often argued that he should have opted for the idea of
a state of states. Agreeing with this standard criticism that a league of states cannot
establish the institutional framework for international justice, others also suggest
an alternative stage model interpretation. According to this interpretation, Kant’s
true ideal is in fact a state of states, whereas the league is merely introduced as a
temporary and second best solution. In contrast to both the standard criticism and
the stage model interpretation, I argue that fundamental normative concerns
count in favour of a league rather than a state of states. I also argue that Kant’s
defense of such a league is consistent with his position on the institutional pre-
conditions for just interaction in the domestic case because of crucial relevant
differences between the state of nature among individuals and the external rela-
tions between states.
I. INTRODUCTION
The starting point for this article is a contested issue among Kant
researchers: What kind of institutional arrangement does or should
Kant prefer for the achievement of a just international legal order?
While there is broad agreement that the idea of a global unitary state
which merges all states into one state should be rejected, the dis-
agreement concerns which of two models is the more adequate:
(a) a league of states vested with judicial, but no coercive, power
which states are free to join and leave at will, or (b) a state of states
which leaves the primary state units as separate entities, but which
permanently establishes coercive power over its members. In this
article, I defend the league of states against two competing positions
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which I call the standard criticism and the stage model interpretation.
According to proponents of both these positions, such a league is a
too weak institutional arrangement for achieving a just international
legal order. In their view, the only institutional model consistent
with Kant’s own theory is a state of states.
Despite this agreement between the standard criticism and the
stage model interpretation concerning the necessity of establishing a
state of states, they disagree on how Kant’s idea of a league of states
should be understood. Proponents of the standard criticism under-
stand the introduction of this idea as a rejection of a state of states,
and argue that there is a problematic mismatch with regard to what
obligations Kant says hold for individuals and what obligations he
says hold for states. The problem arises because Kant draws a parallel
between the original state of nature between individuals and external
relations between states, and at the same time rejects that over-
coming the international state of nature calls for a solution parallel to
the solution to the interpersonal state of nature. With regard to the
latter, Kant claims that persons that cannot avoid interacting with
other persons have an enforceable right and duty to subject them-
selves to a public authority enacting and enforcing positive laws, i.e.,
a state. By contrast, state communities can neither be compelled to
do so, nor should they do so by establishing a state of states. Instead,
they should voluntarily form a league of states. This move is seen as
inconsistent with Kant’s overall theory. As Otfried Höffe puts it:
‘According to the international state of nature argument, the
establishment of a state-like union is already needed between existing
states’, and ‘the thesis about the federalism of free states… is clearly
incompatible with the analogy it rests on’.1
Although proponents of the stage model interpretation agree that
a voluntary league cannot establish the necessary institutional
framework for international justice, they claim that the standard
criticism is based on a misunderstanding regarding the role of the
league. According to Pauline Kleingeld, ‘the standard view of Kant’s
position is mistaken’ and does not recognize that he ‘combines the
defence of a voluntary league with an argument for the ideal of a
world federation with coercive powers’.2 On this reading, the league
1 Höffe (2006, p. 193). For similar claims, see Lutz-Bachmann (1997) and Carson (1988).
2 Kleingeld (2004, p. 304).
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of states is not the final institutional scheme for establishing rightful
international relations, but merely a first step to be superseded by a
state of states when the time is ripe.3 While Kleingeld emphasizes
that the transition from the league of states to the state of states
cannot be forced upon states, an alternative version of the stage
model interpretation is defended by Sharon Byrd and Joachim
Hruschka in a recent article in this journal. In their view, Kant does
not only defend the league of states as an intermediary stage in the
process leading towards the state of states, but also holds the view
that ‘all states may use force to coerce all other states to make this
move’.4
In the following, I contest both versions of the stage model
interpretation, as well as the underlying assumption that they share
with the standard criticism of Kant – namely that overcoming the
international state of nature requires a state of states. In contrast to
adherents of the stage model interpretation, I argue that the league is
Kant’s final conception. In contrast to adherents of both the stage
model interpretation and the standard criticism, I argue that sys-
tematic normative considerations suggest that the league is the
rational ideal whereas the state of states is in conflict with right or
justice.5
In my view, the asymmetries between the domestic and the
international case can be explained with reference to the fact that
peace is an end internal to the doctrine of right, and that its reali-
zation therefore must not oppose the principle of equal freedom
which is at the centre of Kant’s theory. Peace among nations is a
condition of right, not a goal external to it. Being such a condition,
any conceptualization of and attempt at achieving lasting peace must
cohere with what is right. In order to see why this implies a rejection
of the state of states, it is necessary to examine more closely Kant’s
justification for his non-voluntarist view of domestic political obli-
gations, which is the view that a state’s authority to impose duties on
its subjects rests on an enforceable right and duty to enter civil
society, and not on the actual or hypothetical consent of its subjects.6
3 This view is also defended by Byrd (1995), Cavallar (1999), and McCarthy (2002).
4 Byrd and Hruschka (2008, p. 624).
5 In this article I use the terms ‘right’, ‘justice’, and ‘rightful relations’ interchangeably.
6 On Kant’s non-voluntarism, see Varden (2008b).
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In this connection, a crucial point is that irresolvable structural
problems7 in the state of nature make a public authority vested with
coercive powers a necessary precondition of rightful relations
between persons. But insofar as a public institutional framework is a
necessary precondition of rightful relations it is possible to show that
states cannot, as can individuals, be forced to subject themselves to a
public authority and that the public institutional framework consti-
tutive of the international civil condition should not establish a
global monopoly of violence. In addition, focusing on Kant’s justi-
fication for non-voluntarism in the domestic case helps us see why
this conclusion is consistent with the proposal for a league of states.
By considering to what degree the problems with regard to inter-
personal relations apply also to the external relations between states
it can be shown that the international state of nature is similar to the
former only in some respects and therefore does not necessarily call
for a state of states.
In order to explain why Kant regards a coercive public authority
as constitutive of rightful relations between persons and therefore
adheres to a non-voluntarist conception of domestic political obli-
gations, I first give a brief presentation of his conception of right in
section II. Thereafter, in section III, I show what structural problems
make the state of nature a condition incompatible with right. In
section IV, I introduce Kant’s idea of a league of states, and discuss
what critics find problematic about this idea. Here, I also argue that
the stage model interpretation is unconvincing on a textual basis. In
this connection, I consider in particular the arguments put forward
by Byrd and Hruschka. In section V, I first argue that states cannot
be rightfully forced to leave the state of nature, which is also why a
state of states with coercive powers is a problematic goal. Then, I
explain why there is a need for a league, but not a state of states,
arguing that there is only a partial parallel to the interpersonal state
of nature in the external relations between states.
II. KANT’S CONCEPTION OF RIGHT
Kant’s conception of right can be described in terms of the familiar
idea of coercively protected spheres of freedom within which
7 These are the problems of assurance and indeterminacy treated in section III below.
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everyone is equally free to choose as they please. This idea is
expressed in his definition of right as ‘the sum of the conditions
under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom’,8 and is
grounded in each person’s innate right to freedom, the right to
‘independence from being constrained by another’s choice… insofar
as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with
a universal law’.9
While this emphasis on equal freedom places Kant within the
tradition of liberal political thought, there is also an affinity with the
so-called republican tradition, in particular with this tradition’s no-
tion of ‘freedom as non-domination’.10 In contrast to Isaiah Berlin’s
‘negative’ concept of liberty, the innate right to freedom does not
track interferences with regard to goal attainment.11 Whereas Berlin
considers any act by other human beings that frustrates a person’s
wishes as an obstruction of that person’s freedom, Kant says that
right does not concern the ‘relation of one’s choice to the mere wish
… of the other’.12 In his view, to be independent is to be able to set
ends of one’s own without the interference of other people,13 but
not necessarily to be unaffected by the choices other people make.
Since the actions of other people lead to changes in the world they
may indeed frustrate the pursuit of whatever end we choose, but as
long as they do not arrogate or damage our ability to make free
choices they do not restrict our innate right to freedom.
The indifference with regard to the relation between one person’s
choice and another person’s wishes reflects a general aspect of Kant’s
conception of right: the emphasis on the form of the relationship
between interacting persons rather than on substantive standards
such as basic human needs, purposes, interests and the like. The
rightfulness of an action does not depend on it being favorable to the
8 Kant (6:230). All references to Kant in this article are according to the Prussian Academy pagi-
nation. I have made use of the following of his works: The Metaphysics of Morals, PA 6:203–493, in Kant
(1996); ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent’, PA 8:15–31, in Kant (1983); ‘On the
Common Saying: This may Be True in Theory but It Does not Apply in Practice’, PA 8:273–313, in Kant
(1983); ‘To Perpetual Peace – a Philosophical Sketch’, PA 8:341–386, in Kant (1983).
9 Kant (6:237).
10 See, for instance, Pettit (1997).
11 Cf. Berlin (2006, p. 169).
12 Kant (6:230).
13 Arthur Ripstein defends the idea of equal freedom against critics who argue that liberty is not a
self-limiting concept by stressing this point, in Ripstein (2009, pp. 31–39).
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promotion of basic values or fundamental human interests. The only
requirement is that it accords with universal laws – that is, rules
which, first, restrict every person equally and, second, do not merely
represent the choice of one particular person or group.
There is a structural similarity between Kant’s theory of right and
his ethics. In both cases he stresses formality and universality. At the
same time there is an essential difference between the two insofar as
the sphere of right is restricted to ‘what is external in actions’.14
From the perspective of right, our inner dispositions for acting in a
particular way are not of interest. Virtuous action requires the right
kind of motivation, whereas justice is agnostic on this question. In
both cases we are obliged vis-à-vis universal laws of freedom. But as
far as right is concerned, it cannot be demanded that we make the
fulfillment of moral laws the incentive of our action.
This restriction of right to the external sphere is related to the
conceptual link between right and coercion. Even if coercion is an
impediment to or hindrance of external freedom, right is still ana-
lytically connected to an authorization to coerce. Whoever hinders
rightful use of freedom does wrong by laying arbitrary constraints on
the innate right of some other person, and coercion that prevents
such constraints is legitimate, ‘as a hindering of a hindrance to free-
dom’.15 It is therefore no surprise that the requirement of a moral
motive must be abandoned in the sphere of right. For one thing, if
coercion is allowed to reach beyond the external sphere to the
internal motivations of people, we seem to have no substantial
barrier against paternalistic, not to say authoritarian or totalitarian,
intrusions by governments with regard to how one should lead one’s
personal life, how one should think, what one should desire, etc.16
Moreover, such efforts would also be self-defeating for the simple
reason that virtuous action is beyond the reach of possible coercion.
Virtuous or moral action implies that what is done is done because
one recognizes that it is the right thing to do, so whatever a person
does because he or she is externally compelled to do so is not a
virtuous action.
The boundaries of each person’s sphere of freedom demarcate
what powers or means belong to whom. They designate what
14 Kant (6:230).
15 Kant (6:231).
16 Cf. Maus (2002, p. 109).
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empirical objects other people are obliged to refrain from using
without our consent. Among the objects which we can coercively
exclude other people from using, our body is the only thing to which
we have an innate right, and any use of some person’s body not
consented to by this person or any intentional injury caused by one
person on another is wrong. Beyond this entitlement to be in control
of the powers of one’s own body, it must also be possible to be in
rightful control over objects separate from us.
Kant recognizes three kinds of external objects which can be mine
or yours: corporeal things (property right), other persons’ deeds
(contract right), and another’s status in relation to me or you
(domestic right).17 Being separate from us, external objects are not
innately ours. Entitlements to such objects must nonetheless be
possible to acquire. A general prohibition against the use of things
separate from us would be an arbitrary, and thus illegitimate,
restriction of external freedom. The treatment of ‘any object of my
choice as something which could objectively be mine or yours’ is
therefore what Kant calls a ‘postulate’ or ‘permissive law (lex per-
missiva) of practical reason’.18 This implies that we are permitted to
put others under contingent obligations, obligations which they
would not have had if we had not in fact made some specific thing
our own, which further means that a new set of possible wrongs is
generated. Since entitlements to external objects extend our sphere
of external freedom beyond our own body, it is possible for a person
to do wrong without physically interfering with another person, for
instance by using what rightfully belongs to the other without
permission, or by failing to perform a certain deed to which the
other has a contractual right.
On Kant’s account, then, a rightful condition is a condition of
equal independence where each of us is required to refrain from non-
consensually using the persons or possessions of others, as well as to
fulfill contractual agreements. However, the state of nature cannot
possibly be such a condition. Absent a public authority that enacts,
enforces and arbitrates in accordance with positive law, there is in
Kant’s view no way consistent with the principle of right in
which each person’s entitlements could be properly guaranteed or
17 Kant (6:247).
18 Kant (6:246 f.). Cf. also Ludwig (2002, p. 175 f.).
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delimited. In the state of nature some persons will unavoidably be
exposed to arbitrary and non-reciprocal restrictions due to what is
sometimes referred to as problems of assurance and indeterminacy.19
And this leads Kant to the conclusion that to choose to remain in the
state of nature is to do ‘wrong in the highest degree’,20 as well as to
its corollary: that entering civil society is an enforceable right and
duty.
III. THE ASSURANCE AND INDETERMINACY PROBLEMS
The assurance problem is a problem regarding rightful possession. If
a person is in rightful possession of something external, others are
obliged not to make use of it as long as they have not been given
permission to do so by the possessor. The core of the assurance
problem concerns under what conditions people are so obliged.
According to Kant, we are not obliged to leave objects belonging
to others untouched unless they provide us assurance that they
will behave equally with regard to objects belonging to us.21
The question then becomes: How can we rightfully provide such
assurance?
Considering that right is only concerned with external use of
choice, a rightful obligation is necessarily an external obligation. For
this reason, the solution to the assurance problem entails creating a
power strong enough to secure compliance from everyone. This
claim does not rest on the assumption that human beings are made
of such ‘warped wood’ that they cannot be expected to respect the
boundaries between mine and yours virtuously. The problem is not
that we are ‘phenomenal beings’ that ‘need to be reminded by a
physical incentive that we should obey the law’,22 but that reliance
on mere trust in other people for the purpose of providing rightful
assurance is to make oneself dependent on their arbitrary choice.23
Even in an ideal world, where everyone keeps their part of any
agreement, reliance on someone’s promise that she will not infringe
on your acquired rights makes it her choice whether something
19 Ripstein (2004) and Varden (2008a and 2008b).
20 Kant (6:307 f.).
21 Kant (6:255 f.).
22 Williams (2003, p. 83).
23 On this, see Varden (2008b, p. 8 f.).
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external is yours or hers. And since an anarchical condition where no
one is subjected to external constraints fails to guarantee each person
independence from the choice of other people such a condition is
deficient from the perspective of right.
But if virtuous promising does not suffice to provide a rightful
guarantee, neither does creating a power that simply serves as an
irresistible external constraint. Apart from the capacity to restrain all
others without itself being restrained, the power providing assurance
must also be a power that restrains everyone equally. This implies
that no private agent can serve the role as enforcer of justice. As
private, such an enforcer is what Kant calls a ‘unilateral will’,24 and
such a will cannot possibly establish a system of reciprocal restric-
tions. For one thing, its acts of enforcement would be arbitrary from
the perspective of everyone else, since they represent the choice of
the private enforcer. Moreover, a private enforcer can at most
obligate everyone but itself, which means that the assurance prob-
lem remains unsolved with regard to the relation between the en-
forcer and other agents.25 But if a private enforcer fails to obligate
everyone equally, then justice is impossible outside civil society,
because in the state of nature any use of force is private use of force.
The problem of indeterminacy concerns how the distinction
between mine and yours can be rendered accurate in a way com-
patible with the innate right to freedom. In part, this is a problem of
specifying what the abstract principles of private right prescribe
generally, and, in part, it is a problem of applying these principles to
particular cases.26 In relations of private right there may be dis-
agreement concerning the determinate content of each person’s
rights. General principles of right are indeterminate with regard to
what belongs to whom, what counts as the fulfillment of a con-
tracted service, or whether a certain act is exploitative or not, and
thus under certain circumstances leave room for a plurality of
equally reasonable, yet incompatible interpretations. Although there
may be easy cases, there are also circumstances which give room for
24 Kant (6:256).
25 The latter point is emphasized by Varden (2008a, p. 8, 2008b, pp. 10–11).
26 At this point, Ripstein (2009, pp. 145–176) distinguishes between the problems of unilateral choice
and indeterminacy, and thus ends up with three structural problems which make the state of nature a
non-rightful condition. While this is more adequate in certain respects, I stay with the bipartite dis-
tinction between the problems of assurance and indeterminacy, partly due to considerations of space,
and partly because it is sufficient for my main argument to single out these problems.
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reasonable disagreement concerning where the boundary between
mine and yours is to be drawn. The challenge is to resolve such
conflicts of interpretation in a rightful way.
As is the case with the problem of assurance, so Kant’s view on
this second, but logically prior, issue is that there is no way in which
we could actually solve problems related to indeterminacy in the
state of nature. The reason is that there is no authority that could
rightfully decide what interpretation is to prevail.27 Again, the heart
of the problem is that in the state of nature any judgment about the
appropriate distinction between what is mine and what is yours is a
private judgment. Whoever decides where the line is to be drawn
inevitably subjects everyone else to one-sided restrictions, and thus
acts contrary to everyone else’s right to be restricted by universal
laws only. There is, of course, the possibility of coming to bi- or
multilateral agreements on the issues. While this is preferable to the
unilateral imposition of one person or group’s will, it would still not
accord with what is right. We would still be subject to the choices
other people make whether to consent or not, and would therefore
not have the independence implied in the innate right to freedom.
But if there is no solution to the problem of indeterminacy in the
state of nature, then we have a second reason why justice is not
possible outside civil society.
The only way to overcome the problems of assurance and
indeterminacy is, in Kant’s view, to establish a public authority that
organizes legislative, executive and adjudicative bodies, i.e., a state.
As a public authority, a state is an authority that represents the will of
all united. It is a ‘collective general (common) and powerful will’,28
what Rousseau calls a volonté générale, that has no partial interest vis-
à-vis its subjects. It is only such a will that can, by means of legis-
lation and adjudication, determine the boundaries of mine and yours
in a rightful way, and, through its coercive powers, ensure that
everyone is made subject to reciprocal restrictions. And since a
public authority representing everyone subject to its restrictions
equally is a precondition for rightful interaction, there follows the




… that is, … to enter a civil condition’.29 To refuse to do so is to
‘renounce any concepts of right’30 and to choose to ‘remain in a
condition that is not rightful, that is, in which no one is assured of
what is his against violence’.31 Refusing to leave the state of nature is
in other words tantamount to denying others the possible enjoyment
of freedom in accordance with universal laws. Coercing a person to
enter civil society must therefore be permitted as a hindering of a
hindrance to freedom.
It is important to note that according to the interpretation pre-
sented here, Kant’s non-voluntarist conclusion with regard to political
obligations does not depend on the assumption of a morally corrupt
or problematic human nature. The claim is that in the state of nature
even good-natured persons cannot but subject others to their arbi-
trary choice due to the problems of assurance and indeterminacy.
Even under the presupposition that human beings happen to agree on
what is each person’s fair share and also are well-disposed toward
each other in such a way that no one is inclined to violate other
persons’ spheres of external freedom, it would still be wrong in the
highest degree to deny entrance to civil society, because in so doing
one fails to provide the only framework within which rightful inde-
pendence is possible. For this reason, a public coercive framework is
in Kant’s view more than a mere remedy for the ‘inconveniences’ of
the state of nature, as in Locke.32 It is rather a condition for the
possibility of rightful interaction among persons, that is, an enabling
condition for freedom in accordance with universal laws.
IV. FROM THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO THE RIGHT OF NATIONS:
THE PUZZLING REJECTION OF THE STATE OF STATES
The ideal form of the state authority that in Kant’s view is consti-
tutive of civil society, the republic, has two essential institutional
features: first, separation and hierarchical organization of legislative
(sovereign), executive (ruler), and judicial (judge) powers, and,
second, ascription of legislative power ‘to the united will of the




32 Locke (1690, p. 13).
33 Kant (6:313).
IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S LEAGUE OF STATES 301
Kant calls ‘the state in idea, as it ought to be in accordance with pure
principles of right’, and ‘serves as a norm (norma) for every actual
union into a commonwealth’.34 Yet even if conceived in ideal terms,
a republican constitution constitutes only part of the conditions that
as a sum are to enable the free choice of every person to be united
with the free choice of everyone else in accordance with universal
laws. According to Kant, the establishment of ‘a perfect civil con-
stitution’ is dependent on a solution to ‘the problem of law-governed
external relations among nations’.35 Similarly to the state of nature
among persons, the external relations between states are character-
ized as a non-rightful condition which can only be overcome by
entering a civil condition of which an international public authority
is constitutive.36
Although he draws repeated parallels between the original state of
nature among individuals and interstate relations,37 Kant’s view
regarding the institutional presuppositions for just interaction in the
international sphere differs in important respects from his view
regarding the institutional presuppositions for just interaction in the
domestic sphere. In contrast to what he says with regard to the
domestic case, Kant does not say that the international public
authority should be a state authority. Nor does he say that states
have an enforceable right and duty to leave the state of nature.
Rather than a global state authority, he proposes a treaty-based
‘league of peace’ that ‘seeks to end all wars forever’, but without
requiring member states to ‘subject themselves to civil laws and their
constraints (as men in the state of nature must do)’.38 The league is
not to have legislative or executive powers, as it is not founded in
order ‘to meddle in one another’s internal dissensions but to protect
against attacks from without’.39 Furthermore, entrance and exit must
be voluntary. The league is ‘a permanent congress of states’, which
neighboring states are ‘at liberty to join’, and which can ‘be dissolved
at any time’.40 In other words, the institutionalization of an inter-
national civil condition differs from the civil order among persons in
34 Ibid.
35 Kant (8:24).
36 Kant (6:344; 8: 354).
37 Kant (8:354; cf. also 8:24 and 6:344 f.).
38 Kant (8:356).
39 Kant (6:345).
40 Kant (6:350 f.; cf. also 6:345).
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two ways. First, the public authority is no sovereign power, only an
international organization with arbitration capacities. Second, no
state may be legitimately forced to join this organization, which
means that there is no parallel to Kant’s non-voluntarist view of
domestic political obligations at the international level.
It is the rejection of a state of states with coercive power that
motivates the standard criticism. In the critics’ view, Kant, in
drawing an analogy between the interpersonal state of nature and
external state relations, also ought to favor an institutional structure
at the international level analogous to the institutional structure at
the domestic level. What seems primarily to trouble these critics is
that the league of states cannot solve an assurance problem assumed
to exist in the international realm. Since the league does not possess
coercive powers it cannot ensure compliance from its members, and
thus leaves it for each state to decide whether or not to comply with
the league’s judgements. According to the standard criticism, this
means that states will continue to subject one another to arbitrary
choice rather than universal restrictions authorized by the interna-
tional public authority. Consequently, interaction at the international
level will in important respects remain in a state of nature: ‘[S]ince a
federation lacks the instruments requisite for securing that which is
to be agreed on, namely, world peace, there can be peace only with
reservations and qualifications … Without the ‘sword of justice,’ a
federation remains a (modified) state of nature’.41
Few, if any, of these critics think of the state of states in terms of a
global unitary state that reduces existing states to parts which it may
fuse together or split up at will. What is usually held up as an
alternative to both the global unitary state and the league of states is
the idea of complementary statehood, where the second order state
authority is vested with a restricted set of powers and leaves the
primary state units intact. Just as individual persons do not give up,
but affirm, their freedom by entering the civil condition, so the
freedom of every state should be affirmed by its subjection to an
international public authority with narrow competencies: ‘[T]he
correctly formed analogy demands that the ‘republic of states’… not
be organized in opposition to its members’ rights of liberty and
equality. … [T]he ‘republic of states’ would have a mandate for
41 Höffe (2006, p. 200; see also p. 195). The lack of coercive power is also emphasized as the league’s
main deficiency by Byrd (1995), Byrd and Hruschka (2008), Pogge (1988), and Wood (1995).
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action only in those spheres individual states could not regulate on
their own’.42
But even if the international public authority should not be
established at the expense of the first order state communities’ right
to territorial integrity and self-determination, Kant’s analogy is still
said to require some kind of state authority with coercive powers.
Otherwise, there seems to be something wrong with the foundations
of the entire theory. If one can deny that a second order state unit is
constitutive of an international civil condition, then one should also
deny that first order state units are constitutive of rightful relations
among individuals: ‘Either the imperative of individuals to renounce
their freedom in leaving the state of nature already involves a con-
tradiction … Or … international statehood … is a condition that
makes possible the state of international lawfulness’.43
The distinction between a global unitary state and a limited state
of states is also the backdrop of the stage model interpretation.
According to this line of interpretation, the league of states should
not be seen as an alternative to the state of states altogether, but
merely as the first stage in a process that is ultimately to result in a
state of states. On this reading, Kant’s arguments against a global
unitary state, that it dissolves rather than solves the problem of
guaranteeing the right of nations,44 and that it will lead to a ‘soulless
despotism’ which ‘finally degenerates into anarchy’,45 are misun-
derstood if they are taken to be arguments against any form of global
statehood. The real motive behind the introduction of the league of
states, it is said, is not to reject global statehood as such, but to
accommodate to the political realities of his times. Since the obsti-
nate unwillingness of political leaders to comply with a priori prin-
ciples of right makes it unrealistic to expect the realization of the
superior alternative in the near future, Kant suggests that a league of
states may be a first step that prepares for the eventual establishment
of a coercive state of states. Although the league is seen as insuffi-
cient for the purpose of establishing the sought for international civil
condition, it may serve as a temporary surrogate to be superseded by
a state of states when time is ripe: ‘The core of Kant’s argument… is
42 Lutz-Bachmann (1997, p. 71).




that the full realization of perpetual peace does require a federal state
of states …, but that this goal should be pursued mediately, via the
voluntary establishment of a league, and not via premature attempts
to institutionalize a state of states immediately’.46
As for the second difference between the domestic and the
international cases, the voluntary membership in the league, it has
not only been argued that Kant should have opted for the opposite
view, namely that subjection to the international authority must be
compelling47; there are, as mentioned, alternative interpretations in
the secondary literature on this point as well. Recently, Sharon Byrd
and Joachim Hruschka have ascribed the view that any capable state
can force any other state to enter an international civil condition to
Kant.48 According to Byrd and Hruschka, Kant takes a more mature
stance in the Doctrine of Right than in To Perpetual Peace, where states
are said to ‘have outgrown the compulsion to subject themselves to
another legal constitution that is subject to someone else’s concept
of right’.49 They see evidence for such a change of mind in the
discussion of ‘the original right that free states in a state of nature
have to go to war with one another (in order, perhaps, to establish a
condition more closely approaching a rightful condition)’,50 as well
as in the discussions of the right to go to war, right during a war, and
right after a war in the later work. In addition, they find support for
the same conclusion by pointing to a parallel between states and
individuals similar to the one we have seen in connection with
arguments in favor of the state of states. Against the background of
Kant’s characterization of states as moral persons, they claim that
states can acquire analogues to property, contract, and status rights,
and conclude that the enforceable right and duty to leave the state of
nature applies also to state actors.
I think there are good reasons to question both versions of the
stage model interpretation in favor of the more traditional reading,
where Kant is seen as rejecting any model of global statehood and,
consequently, non-voluntarism at the international level. In the next
section, I set out the principled normative considerations that
46 Kleingeld (2004, p. 318). See also Byrd and Hruschka (2008, pp. 637–638), and Cavallar (1999,
pp. 113–131).
47 See, for instance, Carson (1988).
48 Byrd and Hruschka (2008, esp. pp. 624–626).
49 Kant (8:356 f.).
50 Kant (6:345).
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support this view. Yet before I turn to this issue some textual
considerations are in order.
Proponents of the stage model interpretation may find some
support in the often cited passage from To Perpetual Peace, where
Kant seemingly makes an unequivocal judgment in favor of the
state of states, and the league of states is characterized as a ‘negative
surrogate’ brought forward so that ‘everything is not to be lost’.51
Nevertheless, I find it hard to square this reading with the main
tendencies and arguments in this work as well as in the Doctrine of
Right. Even if the proponents of the stage model interpretation take
Kant’s concern for a political world consisting of a plurality of states
into consideration, there is the further complication that Kant
seems to reject global statehood in any form, and not just in the
form of a unitary state. For instance, at the end of the chapter on
the right of nations in the Doctrine of Right, Kant contrasts the idea
of a congress of states, i.e., the league, with a federation like the
US, which ‘is based on a constitution and can therefore not be
dissolved’.52 The fact that he immediately afterwards says that
‘[o]nly by such a congress can the idea of a public right of nations
be realized’,53 suggests that he also rejects more modest proposals
for global statehood. Moreover, directly before the passage where
he is often assumed to reduce the league to a second rate surrogate,
Kant says that the league ‘is necessarily tied rationally to the con-
cept of the right of nations’.54 Later in the same text he also says
that ‘a federative state [föderativer Zustand]’ is ‘the only state of right
compatible with their freedom’.55 Against this background, it seems
implausible that he thinks of the league of states as a temporary
surrogate for a future state of states.
Even if Byrd and Hruschka point to some interesting differences
between To Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Right, it is also hard
to find support for their non-voluntarist interpretation with regard
to the right of nations in the passages they refer to from the latter
work. Consider first the ‘original right’ to go to war which Kant
ascribes to ‘free states in a state of nature’. What Byrd and
51 Kant (8:357). It is possible, however, to exaggerate just how unambiguous the passage is. See, for






Hruschka do not mention is the context of the quote. In the
relevant paragraph (§55), Kant discusses the question whether a
state has a right to use its subjects for war against other states, a
question which he answers only conditionally in the positive, since
citizens cannot be treated as mere means and therefore must
consent to ‘each particular declaration of war’ if they are ‘to serve
in a way full of danger to them’.56 In other words, the argument
does not revolve around the question whether a state can force
other states to enter an international civil condition. The question is
only raised hypothetically as an introduction to a discussion about
another topic, and therefore does not seem to have any direct
impact on the issue dealt with by Byrd and Hruschka. Nor is there
much support for their interpretation in the proceeding paragraphs
(§§56–58) on the right to go to war, right during a war, and right
after a war. Rather than indicate that Kant ‘accepts the right states
have to coerce other states to move to a juridical state of nation
states’,57 the discussion in these paragraphs seems to affirm much of
what is contained in the preliminary articles of To Perpetual Peace
which address questions pertaining to acceptable and non-accept-
able conduct of states in a pre-civil condition, but not the issue of
whether states can be forced to leave this condition. As far as the
parallel between the domestic and the international cases is con-
cerned, it suffices to say at this point that its soundness depends on
the assumption that all the structural problems identified in the
state of nature between persons also apply to the state of nature
between states. This assumption ought to be doubted. I return to
this issue in the following section, after first explaining why states
cannot be rightfully forced to subject themselves to an international
public authority.
V. WHY THE LEAGUE OF STATES IS AND WHY THE STATE OF STATES
IS NOT AN IDEAL PRECONDITION FOR PERPETUAL PEACE
Beyond the textual considerations discussed at the end of the pre-
vious section, there are also principled normative considerations
which make non-voluntarism an inadequate ideal of international
political obligations. The main reason is that such an ideal of
56 Kant (6:346).
57 Byrd and Hruschka (2008, p. 625).
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international political obligations would entitle every capable state to
force other states to become members of a league of states or a state
of states. Such an entitlement is problematic, first, because it allows
the stronger state to set the terms of cooperation unilaterally. This
would be an obvious injustice, since it contradicts the requirement
that every restriction is to be a universal restriction.58 Second, non-
voluntarism in the international sphere implies a right to wage war
in order to enforce exit from the state of nature. This is not to say
that war is the only coercive means available to states in their
relations to other states. Yet in the international sphere an analogue
to the enforceable right and duty of individuals to enter civil society
would in the final resort imply a right to go to war against states that
refuse to leave the state of nature voluntarily. It is therefore tanta-
mount to a right to put existing state sanctioned legal orders at risk,
one’s own as well as those of the other states. But there can be no
right to do this. First and foremost we have a duty to establish a
state, since it constitutes a necessary institutional framework for
rightful interaction among persons. Jeopardizing this framework by
going to war is therefore incompatible with right. Coercing an
unwilling state to leave the international state of nature is not a
hindering of a hindrance to freedom, but employment of unilateral
force opposed to our primary duty to leave the state of nature
among persons. I believe this is the main reason why Kant says that
states have ‘outgrown the compulsion to subject themselves to an-
other legal constitution’.59 The original subjection to any interna-
tional public authority must be based on consent, since the opposite
‘is analogous not to founding a state but to a revolution which fails
and leads to a state of nature’.60
In view of these considerations, one can also see why conceiving
individuals as the basic normative units does not imply a non-statist
conception of international law or that statist conceptions of inter-
national law are based on illiberal or authoritarian theories of the
state.61 Rather than reflecting illiberal authoritarianism, prohibiting
aggressive wars and interventions in the internal affairs of a state
58 Kleingeld seems to have a similar point in mind when arguing that forcing a state to join a state of
states violates the political autonomy of the state that is forced to join (Kleingeld 2004, p. 309). Cf. also
Kant (8:356 f.).
59 Kant (8:355 f.).
60 Maus (2004, p. 91).
61 For the opposite view, see Tesón (1997, pp. 1–2).
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confirms the state’s role as a necessary precondition for each person’s
independence vis-à-vis other persons.
I take it that concerns similar to those which lead to the rejection
of an enforceable right and duty to enter an international civil
condition also motivate Kant’s opposition to a permanent union
of states. This is at least indicated by the claim that the possibility of
dissolving or renouncing the league of states ‘is a right in subsidium of
another original right, to avoid getting involved in a state of actual
war among the other members’.62 When some member states fight
among themselves, any other state must be allowed to withdraw
from the league at will in order to remain neutral. If there were no
such right, every member of the league could be commanded by the
international public authority to become entangled in conflicts be-
tween or within other states. But this would imply that the interna-
tional public authority had a right to put the lives of its member
states’ citizens at risk. Again: there can be no such right. The founding
idea of the state is to guarantee the rightful use of freedom among
interacting persons. In order to provide this guarantee, the state can
demand that its citizens act in a way that is consistent with the
perpetual existence of the state. But citizens are not obliged to risk
their lives in wars against other states as long as their own state is not
directly threatened. If they are forced to fight to assist other states,
they are used for purposes that are not their own. They are thereby
used as mere means, which violates their innate right to freedom.63
Besides, a state’s duty to establish rightful relations between itself and
other states does not imply any obligation to assist other states
whenever they are in conflict with external enemies or are afflicted by
internal violence. To do wrong is to hinder external use of freedom in
accordance with universal laws, and whoever abstains from taking
part in an ongoing conflict does no wrong.
In light of similar considerations, Helga Varden has argued that
the public authority constitutive of rightful international relations
‘cannot ever establish a perpetual monopoly on coercion’.64 While
62 Kant (6:345).
63 Cf. Kant (6:345 f.).
64 Varden (2008a, p. 21). Puzzlingly, she also says that this authority should have a ‘tripartite
republican constitution’ (Varden 2008a, p. 23). I do not see how this claim can be squared with the
rejection of a supranational monopoly of coercion. An international public authority without coercive
powers is an authority which lacks one of the powers constitutive of a republican constitution, namely
the executive power, and could therefore at most have a bipartite constitution.
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this seems like a sound conclusion, we still need to explain why
consent can do a job in the international sphere which Kant says it
cannot do in the domestic sphere. Given Kant’s non-voluntarist
conclusion with regard to domestic political obligations, it is not yet
clear why a league of states is sufficient for the establishment of an
international civil condition. Why is the ‘sword of justice’ dispens-
able in the international realm? In order to give a satisfactory answer
to this question we have to consider in what respect the international
state of nature is a non-rightful condition of war.
At this point, it can be useful to recall that for Kant the term ‘state
of nature’ does not refer to a previously existing condition in his-
torical time that could only be overcome by means of a contract
establishing the state. Rather than describing a previous state of
affairs, it is a theoretical fiction that shows why certain structural
problems make rightful interaction among persons impossible absent
a public authority. As such, it is a term that serves the normative-
practical purpose of displaying that it is pragmatically inconsistent for
agents possessing practical reason to renounce obligations towards
any such authority. Similarly, the characterization of external rela-
tions between states as a state of nature is a proposition about the
ideal preconditions for justice in the international sphere: in this
sphere too there are irresolvable structural problems which make
rightful interaction impossible unless there is established a second
order public authority. The crucial question is therefore in what
respect the structural problems in the latter case are similar to and in
what respect they are different from those in the former case.
We saw in the previous section that the proponents of the state of
states assume that there is an assurance problem in the international
sphere which a league of states cannot solve. Given this assumption,
the conclusion that a second order public authority with coercive
powers is constitutive of an international civil condition is convinc-
ing. Insofar as the major concern is to provide rightful assurance, and
no particular state can serve as an external guarantor, since each
state, considered in opposition to other states, in such a case would
represent a particular will whose relation to the others is also in need
of regulation, a state of states appears necessary in order for states to
interact rightfully. However, the premise that there is an assurance
problem to be solved in the external relations between states is false.
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In his recent book Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein observes
that there is in fact no reference to such a problem in Kant’s
discussion of conflicts between states.65 What we find is a partial
analogue to the problem of indeterminacy, but there is no analogue
to the claim that we are not obliged to leave what belongs to others
untouched unless we are provided assurance that they will behave
accordingly with regard to what is ours. According to Ripstein, this
deviation from the domestic case reflects two features of states
which distinguish them from persons: first, states do not have
external objects of choice, and second, states have a fundamentally
public nature.
Unlike Byrd and Hruschka, who conceive of a state’s territory as
the property of the state, Ripstein argues that territory, in Kant’s
view, ‘is just the spatial manifestation of the state’.66 That is to say
that territory constitutes the state’s person in its external relation to
other states and therefore should be conceived of as analogous to a
person’s body rather than as analogous to her possessions. If this is
correct, it explains why Kant does not speak of an assurance problem
in the international state of nature. As argued in section III, there is
an irresolvable assurance problem in the state of nature between
individual persons because these persons have enforceable rights to
external objects of choice which no one is in a position to rightfully
enforce. This problem does not arise with regard to the right persons
have to their own bodies. Other persons are always obliged to not
violate our bodily integrity. Resisting violations against it with force
is therefore not contrary to right. In fending off aggressors one does
not impose unilateral force on others, but merely hinders a hin-
drance to freedom. Similarly, if territory is what a state is, perceived
externally, then there is no assurance problem in the international
sphere, because there are no external objects of choice with regard to
which assurance must be provided.67 Any wrong done by one state
against another state is comparable to the wrong one person does
against the body of another person, and can rightfully be resisted
65 Ripstein (2009, pp. 227–228).
66 Ibid., p. 228.
67 By the same token, Byrd and Hruschka’s inference from non-voluntarism in the domestic case to
non-voluntarism in the international case is undermined. It is the normative requirement that it must be
possible to have rightful possession which justifies the use of coercive means for the purpose of
establishing a civil condition among individuals (6:256). But if states do not have external objects of
choice a crucial premise is missing, and a mere parallel from the one case to the other will not do.
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with force by the aggrieved party. Acknowledging defensive wars as
legitimate, Kant speaks of ‘the right to go to war’ in the state of nature
as ‘the way in which a state is permitted to prosecute its right against
another state … when it believes it has been wronged by the other
state’.68
Against this, one can object that states are artificial entities that
have no natural borders comparable to a person’s body. For one
thing, it is not always clear just where the borders between neigh-
boring states are, whereas it is generally easy to tell whether
something is part of a specific person’s body. Also, territory can be
divided and disposed of more easily than can body parts. The latter
difference seems to be the main reason why Byrd and Hruschka
speak of territory as property.69
While the artificiality of a state’s borders certainly makes the
relation of state and territory different from the relation of person
and body, I do not think it suffices for arguing that the former
relation is structurally the same as the relation of person and prop-
erty. As a category of right, property is most appropriately described
as means with which a person has an exclusive right to pursue
whatever end he or she chooses. Property therefore stands in a
means-end relation to the choices of persons. For reasons which
have to do with the second difference between a state and a person,
the public nature of the state, we cannot think of territory in the
same way. Being a public authority, a state does not have ends of its
own. Its sole function is to provide a coercive institutional frame-
work which enables citizens to interact in a rightful way. Therefore
it is not appropriate to speak of territory as some means with which
a state can pursue private purposes. Territorial borders should rather
be understood as the demarcation of the sphere of validity of the
public order constituted by the state. In this perspective, borders are
the limits of a state’s ‘inner’ lawgiving. Externally, from the per-
spective of other states, these limits make up the person of the state,
which is to say that territory counts as embodiment and not as
property.
Beyond this, there is also a separate reason why the public
nature of the state supports the view that there is no assurance
68 Kant (6:346).
69 Byrd and Hruschka (2008, p. 625 f.).
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problem in the international sphere. In virtue of being a public
rightful condition, a state can only act for public ends, such as
continually approximating an ideal republican constitution and
sustaining the already established public order. In our context, the
crucial implication of this notion of a state is that it is conceptually
impossible for any genuine state to wage aggressive wars. The only
rightful or just cause for which a state can fight wars is to preserve
itself as a public order. As argued above, not only do aggressive
wars violate the rights of the state under attack. To wage war is to
put the necessary institutional framework for rightful interaction at
risk, and is therefore at odds with our primary duty to leave the
state of nature, unless required for the state’s survival. Conse-
quently, just states can only fight defensive wars, since fighting
non-defensive wars is irreconcilable with their status as public
authorities.
In view of these reflections regarding states’ lack of external ob-
jects of choice as well as their essentially public nature one can see
why a ‘sword of justice’ is not needed for establishing an interna-
tional civil condition. Both aspects imply that there is no assurance
problem in the international sphere, and so rightful interaction
among states is possible without a strong physical power securing
compliance from everyone. This means that an important premise
for the stage model reading of Kant’s position on international right
is undermined. If it is possible for states to interact rightfully without
subjecting themselves to a public coercive authority, then there
seems to be no reason why a league of states should be seen as a
temporary surrogate for a more satisfactory institutional framework
to be implemented at a later point in time. The league, however, is
still needed in order to overcome an indeterminacy problem in the
external relations between states. This problem arises with regard to
at least two different kinds of issues: rightful use of defensive force,70
and rightful determination of national borders.71
Even if every state has a right to fight defensive wars, it is not
necessarily clear what acts amount to aggression in every particular
case. Discussing a state’s right to execute its own right against other
states, Kant does not only recognize ‘active violations’, or ‘first
70 This is emphasized by Ripstein (2009, p. 227).
71 This is emphasized by Varden (2008a, pp. 18 f.).
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aggression’, as legitimate grounds for defensive use of force. A state
may also be threatened by another state, either by the other state’s
preparations for war, or by its ‘menacing increase in… power (by its
acquisition of territory)’.72 This makes it possible for states to rea-
sonably disagree on whether certain uses of force are aggressive or
defensive. What one state considers an act of first aggression, the
other state may consider a preemptive action covered by its right to
self-defense. In the state of nature there is no rightful way to settle
such conflicting rights claims. As long as there is ‘no judge compe-
tent to render a verdict having rightful force’,73 each state is within
its right to follow its own judgment. Yet thereby they employ force
on the basis of their own arbitrary choice, which is contrary to right.
The same problem applies to disputes about borders. Whenever
there is disagreement in the state of nature concerning where the
lines between different states’ jurisdictions are to be drawn, any
judgment made on the issue is the particular judgment of one state.
This again means that states in the state of nature are unavoidably
subjected to arbitrary choice rather than universal law. Irrespective
of whether a particular state’s judgment is forced through or the
parties in the dispute come to an agreement, the relation between
the states is not one of rightful independence.
Even if a state of states is not required, the existence of an
indeterminacy problem in the international sphere still makes an
international public authority with judicial powers necessary in order
to overcome the international state of nature. The league of states is
such an authority, and can therefore be seen as an ideal precondition
for rightful relations between states. Of course, being a voluntary
congress which can be dissolved at any time, the league cannot
provide a guarantee that existing states will accept its decisions.
Individual states may be dissatisfied with specific decisions and thus
choose to act on their own unilateral judgment. Yet this circum-
stance does not challenge the view that a voluntary league provides
the institutional framework constitutive of an international civil
condition. In refusing to comply with the verdict of the public
authority, a state does wrong, but it does not do so unavoidably. In




however just and right-loving it might be, has no choice but to either
act on its own unilateral judgment or else yield to that of another
state. As an arbiter, the league provides the means by which con-
flicting claims made by states vis-à-vis each other can be resolved in a
rightful way. In this way it establishes the minimal conditions re-
quired for states to decide ‘disputes in a civil way, as if by a lawsuit,
rather than in a barbaric way (the way of savages), namely by war’.74
VI. SUMMARY
In this article, I have defended Kant’s league of states as a rational
ideal constitutive of international justice against proponents of the
standard criticism and the stage model interpretation. Against the
latter position, I have considered textual evidence which indicates
that the league is not merely the first stage of a process leading
towards an international civil condition which has to find its final
form in a state of states. More importantly, I have challenged the
common premise of both competing positions, namely that a league
of states is insufficient for establishing rightful relations between
states. In contrast to this view, I have argued that normative con-
cerns related to the rationale for establishing states lead Kant to
conclusions with regard to international justice that differ from the
conclusions he draws in the domestic sphere. In addition, I have
argued that there is no contradiction involved here. By focusing on
structural problems under ideal conditions, it can be explained why
the institutional preconditions for rightful interaction are different in
the domestic and the international sphere. The only international
parallel to the state of nature between individuals is an indetermi-
nacy problem which can be overcome by establishing an interna-
tional public authority with judicial authority, i.e., a league of states.
In other words, if my arguments are sound, there are good reasons
to think that the ideal institutional structure for approaching per-
petual peace which Kant has in mind is indicated by the three
definitive articles of To Perpetual Peace: an order of independent
republican states75 whose disputes are dealt with in a common
74 Kant (6:351).
75 By this I do not imply that an internal republican constitution is a criterion for membership in the
league, only that the republican constitution is the ideal toward which states should strive as far as their
internal order is concerned.
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intergovernmental organization, and whose citizens have a right to
make attempts at contact across borders without thereby being
treated as enemies. There are also good reasons to endorse this
structure as a rational ideal as well as to reject the claim that it is at
odds with Kant’s overall theory.
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